The study of the history of ideas is usually devoted to big problems and to concluded debates. We have attempted to analyze a current theory whose fate and explanatory power is still not determined. The term microparadigm is used to define a currently and widely accepted theory limited in time and in the field of application, compared to the greater problems usually investigated by historians of science. Among the characteristics defining a microparadigm we found: 1) the status of an accepted (...) theory with creative scientific power; 2) the presence of anomalies and unproven inferences; 3) a limited field of application; 4) the peculiarity of interaction with non-scientific ideas. In this context, we discuss the rise of the current microparadigm concerning the pathogenesis and biology of lymphoid neoplasms. We show that the current view of the neoplastic lymphoid cells as populations frozen at a particular differentiative stage has been creative for the last 10 years, thus allowing the generation of a large body of data that would not have been collected within the previous view of the leukemic cell as completely “anarchic”. This paradigm, although containing some anomalies, has survived the impact of molecular biology in hematology and is still creative. We think that microparadigms are widely distributed in everyday science and that an analysis of them is as useful for active scientist as is the study of macroparadigms, which by themselves cannot be representative of everyday science. Finally, the study of microparadigms while they are still operative can be useful to evidence the weakness of the theory and to suggest where new data should be sought. (shrink)

Of all the thinkers of the century of genius that inaugurated modern philosophy, none lived an intellectual life more rich and varied than Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Maria Rosa Antognazza's pioneering biography provides a unified portrait of this unique thinker and the world from which he came. At the centre of the huge range of Leibniz's apparently miscellaneous endeavours, Antognazza reveals a single master project lending unity to his extraordinarily multifaceted life's work. Throughout the vicissitudes of his long life, (...) Leibniz tenaciously pursued the dream of a systematic reform and advancement of all the sciences. As well as tracing the threads of continuity that bound these theoretical and practical activities to this all-embracing plan, this illuminating study also traces these threads back into the intellectual traditions of the Holy Roman Empire in which Leibniz lived and throughout the broader intellectual networks that linked him to patrons in countries as distant as Russia and to correspondents as far afield as China. (shrink)

Drawing inspiration from a well-attested historical tradition, I propose an account of cognition according to which knowledge is not only prior to belief; it is also, and crucially, not a kind of belief. Believing, in turn, is not some sort of botched knowing, but a mental state fundamentally different from knowing, with its own distinctive and complementary role in our cognitive life. I conclude that the main battle-line in the history of epistemology is drawn between the affirmation of a natural (...) mental state in which there is a contact between ‘mind’ and ‘reality’ (whatever the ontological nature of this ‘reality’) and the rejection of such a natural mental state. For the former position, there is a mental state which is different in kind from belief, and which is constituted by the presence of the object of cognition to the cognitive subject, with no gap between them. For the latter position, all our cognition is belief, and the question becomes how and when belief is permissible. (shrink)

Desde las filosofías de la imaginación y vitalista, María Zambrano habla del exilio político. Lo protagonizan los bienaventurados, a saber, los fieles a sus ideales, unos seres libres que no mienten porque no necesitan los disfraces de la maldad. Las fases del exilio son: 1) el destierro o pérdida d..

Leibniz's metaphysics appears to go a long way towards monism: it supports a strong dependence of limited things on the absolute or God and understands this dependence not only as causal dependence but also as a pervasive ontological dependence which involves the communality of nature between absolute and limited. Yet, Leibniz stops short of affirming monism. Why? This paper takes a fresh look at Leibniz's reasons for opposing monism through the lens of a virtually unknown text of 1698 on the (...) metaphysical foundations of the infinite. Against the backdrop of the present-day monistic proposals of Jonathan Schaffer and Michael Della Rocca, the paper identifies and evaluates four different types of monism: 1. Whole-Part Monism; 2. World-Animal Monism; 3. God-Nature Monism and 4. Eleatic Monism. It argues that Leibniz's opposition to Whole-Part Monism, World-Animal Monism, and God-Nature Monism, is due to his conceptions of the infinite and of what it is to be “an absolutely absolute Being”. Furthermore, it argues that the only type of monism which could preserve Leibniz's demanding notions of real infinite and absolute is Eleatic Monism. The latter, however, is also rejected by Leibniz due to our first-hand experience of what it is to be a substance. (shrink)

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz was a man of extraordinary intellectual creativity who lived an exceptionally rich and varied intellectual life in troubled times. More than anything else, he was a man who wanted to improve the life of his fellow human beings through the advancement of all the sciences and the establishment of a stable and just political order. In this Very Short Introduction Maria Rosa Antognazza outlines the central features of Leibniz's philosophy in the context of his overarching (...) intellectual vision and aspirations. Against the backdrop of Leibniz's encompassing scientific ambitions, she introduces the fundamental principles of Leibniz's thought, as well as his theory of truth and theory of knowledge. Exploring Leibniz's contributions to logic, mathematics, physics, and metaphysics, she considers how his theories sat alongside his concerns with politics, diplomacy, and a broad range of practical reforms: juridical, economic, administrative, technological, medical, and ecclesiastical. Discussing Leinbniz's theories of possible worlds, she concludes by looking at what is ultimately real in this actual world that we experience, the good and evil there is in it, and Leibniz's response to the problem of evil through his theodicy. ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable. (shrink)

In this paper I will discuss certain aspects of Leibniz's theory and practice of 'soft reasoning' as exemplified by his defence of two central mysteries of the Christian revelation: the Trinity and the Incarnation. By theory and practice of 'soft' or 'broad' reasoning, I mean the development of rational strategies which can successefully be applied to the many areas of human understanding which escape strict demonstration, that is, the 'hard' or 'narrow' reasoning typical of mathematical argumentation. These strategies disclose an (...) 'other' reason, i.e. a complementary set of arguments and methods developed by Leibniz in order to deal with crucial issues such as the 'weighting' of probabilities and truths of fact. I will argue that one of the most compelling examples of the importance and fertility of Leibniz's 'other' reason is provided by his solution to the problems posed by the unique epistemological status of theological mysteries. (shrink)

This paper advances the view that the history of philosophy is both a kind of history and a kind of philosophy. Through a discussion of some examples from epistemology, metaphysics, and the historiography of philosophy, it explores the benefit to philosophy of a deep and broad engagement with its history. It comes to the conclusion that doing history of philosophy is a way to think outside the box of the current philosophical orthodoxies. Somewhat paradoxically, far from imprisoning its students in (...) outdated and crystallized views, the history of philosophy trains the mind to think differently and alternatively about the fundamental problems of philosophy. It keeps us alert to the fact that latest is not always best, and that a genuinely new perspective often means embracing and developing an old insight. The upshot is that the study of the history of philosophy has an innovative and subversive potential, and that philosophy has a great deal to gain from a long, broad, and deep conversation with its history. (shrink)

Leibniz's repeated interventions in the Trinitarian polemics widespread throughout Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries cannot merely be read as scholastic exercises or concessions to the conventions of his time. On the contrary, they involved reflection on issues fundamental to Leibniz's philosophical doctrines: issues such as the relationship between faith and reason, the limitations of the human intellect and the various grades of human knowledge, and the significance of the ' analogia Trinitatis' reconsidered in light of the concept of (...) harmony. This paper concentrates on the writings of the young Leibniz before his visit to Paris and aims to examine the role played by contemporary discussions concerning the Trinity and the Incarnation in the formation of Leibniz's thought. (shrink)

This chapter argues that the outbreak of the Protestant Reformation undermined the Christian consensus that unaided human reason could prove God’s existence. As a consequence the issue of the provability of God in principle gained new prominence and had to be addressed in the first instance before entering the discussion of specific proofs of His existence. On the basis of the answers given to the preliminary question of the provability of God’s existence, the chapter discusses eighteenth-century reformulations of a priori (...) and a posteriori arguments for the existence of God, as well as new directions taken by natural theology in the late eighteenth century. (shrink)

Introductions to epistemology routinely define knowledge as a kind of belief which meets certain criteria. In the first two sections of this article, I discuss this account and its application to religious epistemology by the influential movement known as Reformed Epistemology. In the last section, I argue that the controversial consequences drawn from this account by Reformed Epistemology offer one of the best illustrations of the untenability of a conception of knowledge as a kind of belief. I conclude by sketching (...) an alternative account of cognition which also provides a different framework for religious epistemology. (shrink)

This paper aims to show that a proper understanding of what Leibniz meant by “hypercategorematic infinite” sheds light on some fundamental aspects of his conceptions of God and of the relationship between God and created simple substances or monads. After revisiting Leibniz’s distinction between (i) syncategorematic infinite, (ii) categorematic infinite, and (iii) actual infinite, I examine his claim that the hypercategorematic infinite is “God himself” in conjunction with other key statements about God. I then discuss the issue of whether the (...) hypercategorematic infinite is a “whole”, comparing the four kinds of infinite outlined by Leibniz in 1706 with the three degrees of infinity outlined in 1676. In the last section, I discuss the relationship between the hypercategorematic infinite and created simple substances. I conclude that, for Leibniz, only a being beyond all determinations but eminently embracing all determinations can enjoy the pure positivity of what is truly infinite while constituting the ontological grounding of all things. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that, in Leibniz’s mature metaphysics, primary matter is not a positive constituent which must be added to the form in order to have a substance. Primary matter is merely a way to express the negation of some further perfection. It does not have a positive ontological status and merely indicates the limitation or imperfection of a substance. To be sure, Leibniz is less than explicit on this point, and in many texts he writes as if (...) primary matter were a positive constituent of a substance. It seems to me, however, that the view most in keeping with the thrust of his mature philosophical system is that captured by a striking remark of 1695: “Materia rerum est nihilum: id est limitatio [The matter of things is nothing: that is, limitation].” This becomes especially apparent in texts showing that Leibniz’s conception of primary matter corresponds to his conception of creaturely limitation. I start by discussing the notion of primary matter in the scholastic tradition. I then show that although Leibniz places the scholastic terminology of primary matter at a crucial juncture of his metaphysics, he thinks of primary matter in a way which significantly deviates from earlier scholastic views. I conclude that despite his adoption of distinctive terminology of Aristotelian scholasticism, instead of holding a broadly Aristotelian concept of primary matter as the ultimate subject of inherence, Leibniz thinks of primary matter according to a Neoplatonic blue-print in which matter is non-being, privation, mere absence of perfection. (shrink)

Con un altero de filósofos contemporáneos y sus obras, el Dr. Mario Teodoro Ramírez Cobián se asoma al cambio del paradigma nomológico al sistémico, sin declararlo. Hablar de sistemas es hablar de relaciones, hablar de quiasmo es hablar del entrecruce entre lo natural y lo cultural; entre lo fenoménico y los productos humanos; entre el sujeto y el objeto; entre facultades y emociones... Enamorado de la estética y de las artes, Merleau- Ponty. Para llegar a estos hallazgos, este filósofo francés (...) analizado bajo la lupa de Mario Teodoro, se colocó al lado de la corporalidad que toma sus formas intensasen las percepciones y el juicio del gusto. El quiasmo (chiasmón, del griego), intermedio. En retórica es el entrecruce de dos estructuras paralelas donde la segunda invierte el orden de la primera. Quiasmo también es el vínculo entre el lector y el texto o herme-néutica. Como historicista y fenomenólogo, llega al holon, a la gestalt, a la vida la creación y auto creación que revela el determinismo, del azar. Merleau-Ponty toma el lado de la corporalidad que construye y destruye con el quiasmo semiótico, entre cruza sentido, y al arte cuyo centro está en todas partes y su circunferencia en ninguno. Considera el cuerpo como la potencia que ve, toca, oye; de lo consciente e inconsciente. Leer los escritos de Mario Teodoro sobre Merleau- Ponty nos enseña el holon, el vitalismo histórico, lo consciente e inconsciente. (shrink)

Throughout his long intellectual life, Leibniz penned his reflections on Christian theology, yet this wealth of material has never been systematically gathered or studied. This book addresses an important and central aspect of these neglected materials—Leibniz’s writings on two mysteries central to Christian thought, the Trinity and the Incarnation. -/- From Antognazza’s study emerges a portrait of a thinker surprisingly receptive to traditional Christian theology and profoundly committed to defending the legitimacy of truths beyond the full grasp of human reason. (...) This view of Leibniz differs strikingly from traditional perceptions of the philosopher as a “hard” rationalist and quasi-deist. Antognazza also sets Leibniz’s writings in the context of the important theological controversies of his day. (shrink)

This contribution discusses Leibniz’s conception of faith and its relation to reason. It shows that, for Leibniz, faith embraces both cognitive and non-cognitive dimensions: although it must be grounded in reason, it is not merely reasonable belief. Moreover, for Leibniz, a truth of faith (like any truth) can never be contrary to reason but can be above the limits of comprehension of human reason. The latter is the epistemic status of the Christian mysteries. This view raises the problem of how (...) it can be determined whether a doctrine above the full grasp of human reason does or does not imply contradiction. The notion of ‘presumption’ and the ‘strategy of defence’ are presented and discussed as Leibniz’s way to tackle this issue. Finally, the article explores the ‘motives of credibility’ which, according to Leibniz, can and should be produced to uphold the credibility of a putative divine revelation, including his account of miracles. (shrink)

This contribution discusses Leibniz’s conception of the Christian church, his life-long ecumenical efforts, and his stance toward religious toleration. Leibniz’s regarded the main Christian denominations as particular churches constituting the only one truly catholic or universal church, whose authority went back to apostolic times, and whose theology was to be traced back to the entire ecclesiastical tradition. This is the ecclesiology which underpins his ecumenism. The main phases and features of his work toward reunification of Protestants and Roman Catholics, and (...) unification of Protestant churches are briefly explored, before turning to the issue of religious toleration. It is argued that a remarkably inclusive conception of toleration can be gleaned from a broad sample of Leibniz’s writings and correspondence. It is thanks to the philosophical and theological grounds of this conception that toleration can in principle be extended, for Leibniz, to all men and women of good will, including non-Christians, pagans, and atheists. (shrink)

Cuando la humanidad adquirióel se.ntidohist6ricoalcanz6 concienciade lahistoncidad de su vida. Supo entonces que el pasado va influyendo en unos presentes, y se abocó con empeño a seguir los pasos del sentido que marchan del ayer a un hoy siempre en curso, siempre en fuga. En particular..

Argues that academics’ intellectual engagement with a public beyond the walls of their own specialties, and even beyond the walls of the academy, was long a commonplace and significant part of the work of professors and writers in the humanities.

Este trabajo trata de las aguas termales explotadas en dos contextos nacionales diferentes: en la ciudad argentina de Nueva Federación y en el municipio catarinense de Santo Amaro da Imperatriz, dialogando con una amplia literatura sobre este tema, y destacando sus múltiples usos, centrados para la salud, para actividades de ocio y religiosas. Además, estas aguas son asumidas como patrimonio natural y cultural, como fuente de identificación y referencia simbólica, y como el centro de las disputas en "campos sociales de (...) conflicto", relativos al poder de su uso y su apropiación. También se destacan, más allá de la similitud en la forma en que las aguas termales son explotadas y pensadas en los referidos contextos, las especificidades que marcan ambos balnearios. Por último, se subraya la importancia del termalismo tanto para la Provincia de Entre Ríos como para el Estado de Santa Catarina. (shrink)

What are intuitions? Do they exist as distinctive mental states? Do they have an epistemic function? Can we discern specific features that characterize intuitions? Questions like these are widely d...

This chapter examines the moral philosophy of four early modern thinkers – Descartes, Malebranche, Leibniz, and Spinoza – who affirm in different ways the Platonic intuition of the priority of the perfect or infinite over the limited beings of which we have experience. In making this affirmation, Descartes, Malebranche, and Leibniz share the framework of a substantially traditional conception of God. Spinoza, on the other hand, challenges the Christianized Platonism of the other three while stretching to the extreme some features (...) of Platonism. (shrink)

As one might expect, throughout his life Leibniz assumed an attitude of religious toleration both ad intra (that is, toward Christians of other confessions) and ad extra (that is, toward non-Christians, notably Muslims). The aim of this paper is to uncover the philosophical and theological foundations of Leibniz’s views on this subject. Focusing in particular on his epistolary exchange with the French Catholic convert Paul Pellisson-Fontanier, I argue that neither toleration ad intra nor toleration ad extra is grounded for Leibniz (...) in indifference toward the content of revealed religion. On the contrary, Leibniz remained convinced of the objective truth of the Christian religion as it is handed down by the millennia-old tradition of the truly universal church. In his view, reasons internal to the very nature of salvation and to the conception of God and man explicitly contained in or, at least, in accord with this tradition present religious toleration as the only justifiable answer to the differences among religions. (shrink)